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Legislation  recently  introduced  by  Congressman Stephen NeaI  uandates
that  price  stability  receiwe  the  hlghest  priorlty  of  the  Federal  Reserve.r
Because of  the  rener+ed policy  interest  1n prlce  stability,  the  potential  costs
and beuefits....of  .achieving  it  have  attracted  nuch  attentlon:2  Anong the
envisioned  benefits  of  price  stablllty  are  the  reduction  of  inflatiou-lnduced
distortl-ons  that  result  because  of  the  nonindexation  of  the  tax  system  and the
reduction  of  transaction  costs  (or  shoe-leather  costs)  of  changing  lnteresc-
bearing  assets  to  cash  and vice  wersa.  One of  the  more  important  benefits
autributed  to  price  stabllity  is  that  it  lessens  the  uncertainty  associated
with  the  long-run  price  lewel  and the  detrlmental  effects  this  uncertainty  can
have  on  long-tern  contracting  and resource  allocation  (Hall  1981;  Black  1-990;
Parry  L990; Hoskins 1991;  Surnrners  1991).  Proponents of  ptice  stabillty  argue
that  because money is  an  intertemporal  store  of  value,  an uncertain  prlce
level  causes  people  to  devote  resources  to  proteeting  themselves  agalnst
potential  declines  in  the  walue  of  money.  Therefore,  eliminating  price  level
uncertainty  allows  a more efflcient  allocation  of  resources.  The costs  of
achieving  price  stability  are  primarily  associated  with  the  shorE-terd
adjustment  costs  of  moving  from  the  current  lnflationary  regime  to  the  price
stabillty  regime--such  as the  lost  output  resulting  from  inflation  being  less
than  anticipated.
Whlle  the  subject  of  price  stability  has  receiwed  nuch  attention,  there
has been  relatively  little  dlscussion  about  the  speclfic  monetary  policies
that  would  enable  the  Federal  Reserwe to  achieve  and maintain  price  stability.
House  of  Representatives
See Aiyagari  (1990,  f99l )
Joint  Resolution  409
and Hoskins  (1991).
1Rather  than  add  to  the  debate  about  the  costs  and benefits  of  prlce  stability,
this  paper  examines  the  conditions  under  rrhich  monetary  policy  would  ensure
prlce  stability  and examines  a broad  class  of  nonetary  rules  to  determine
\rhether  these  policies  would  enable  the  Federal  Reserve  to  achieve  price
stab il  iry  .
operational  definition  of  prlce  stability  to  be  stabillty  of Taking  the
prices  around  a  particular  price  level,  ve  show  that  achieving  price  stability
inplies  strong,  long-run  restrictions  on  the  behavlor  of  monetary  aggregates.
trIe outline  these  rescrictlons  and  demonstrate  condltions  under  which  speclfic
monetary  rules  are  consistent  wlth  price  stability.  The  monetary  rules
examined  include  nonetary  aggregate  targetlng,  nominal  GNP targeting,  prLce
level  targeting,  and  intefest  rate  targeting.  We show  that  price  level
targetinB,  and  to  a  lesser  extent,  nominal  GNP targeting  are  uore  likely  to  be
consistent  wlth  prlce  stability  than  is  targetlng  monetary  aggregates  or
targeting  interest  rates,  Finally,  whlle  we  rnake no  judgments  ebout  the
relatiwe  metits  of  the  various  alternative  r0onetary  policy  rules,  we  do
suggest  how  one  rnight  lncorporate  the  goal  of  price  stabillLy  into  a  formal
analysis  of  optirnal  uonetary  poliey.
1I.  Defining  Price  Stabil itv
Before  we examine  the  inplications  of  price  stability  for  monetary
poliey,  it  is  necessary  to  clear  up  some ambiguity  about  the  precise
definition  of  "ptlce  stability."  There  seem to  be  two  alternative  notlons  of
price  stability  floating  around  in  the  literature.  The first  notlon  ls  that
price  stability  mean6 zero  inflatlon--that  is,  the  monetary  authority  shouldstrive  for  zero  average  lnflation.3  The second notlon  is  that  price
stability  requires  the  long-run  lewel  of  prices  to  be  sEable  around  a
particular  level.
l^Ie  argue  that  the  second notlon  of  price  stability  better  captures  the
Iong-term  belefits  enwlsioned  by  the  proponents  of  price  s  tab ll  ity--nanely,
reducing  long-term  uncertainty  about  the  price  level.  The reason  for  this  is
that  stabilizLng  prices  around  a partlcular  level  versus  just  ualntaining  a
zexo  €-vera9e inflation  rate  can  inply  substantially  different  lewels  of  long-
run  uncerEainty.  Whlle  zero  average  lnflation  is  a  necessary  condltlon  for
achievlng  the  reduction  of  long-term  uncertainty  about  che price  level,  lt  is
not  sufficient.
To  illustrate  this  polnt,  suppose the  monetary  authoxity  can  contfol  the
rnoney supply  so  that  the  following  prlce  level  behaviors  are  feasible:  lhe
s  irnple  price  level  rule
(1)  n.  :  p'  *  eet
and  the  zero,  "on  average, "  inflation  rule
(Z)  trr  -  €;rt.
For  sirnplicity,  Iet  e"t  and  er.  be  white-noise  errors  with  mean  zero  and
variance  o2o  and  o2*  tespectlwely.  Note  that  under  both  rules,  the  average
inflation  rate  or  unconditional  expectation  of  inflation,  E(zr.),  ls  zero-
However,  the  conditional  expectation  of  lnflaEion  for  the  price  level  rule,
E(n.*1 lI.  ) ,  is  -eot_r .
The  short-term  unceftainty  inherent  for  these  tr,/o prlce  rules,  as
measured  by  var[p.*,  -  E(p"*r11.)  ]  is  giwen  by  o2,  and  o2*,  This  short-term
3  The debate  bet\^reen  Aiyagari  and Hoskins  seems to  be  set  in  the  context
of  a zero  lnflation  target.uncertainty  depends on  the  structure  of  the  economy,  the  information  awailable
to  the  monetary  authority,  and  the  sources  of  shocks  to  the  economy.  ln
general,  there  ate  no  clear  predictions  about  which  type  of  rule  would
generate  the  most  short-tern  uncertainty.a  However,  the  inflatlon  rule  is
almost  certaln.  to  .generate  mor€ long-tem  uncertalntyr  Let  E(p.r1 lIr)  be  the
optinal  forecast  of  pr*r,  given  the  infornation  set  at  tiDe  t.  For  the
inflation  rule,
(3)  var [p.n* -  E(pt+r  lIr)]  -  o2"k  ,
while  for  the  price  level  rule
(4)  var[p.*1 -  E(pt+tlI.)j  -  o'n.
In  contrast  to  the  constant  variance  of  the  price  level  rule,  the  uncertainty
assoclated  with  long-run  forecasts  of  the  price  level  under  lhe  zero  inflatlon
rate  rule  grows  linearly  with  the  forecast  hor1zon.5  Thus,  the  prlce  1evel
rule  and  the  zero  inflation  rate  rule  irnply  wery  different  levels  of  long-run
uncertainty  .
The difference  in  the  long-tern  uncertainty  inherent  in  the  tlro  notions
of  price  stablllty  arises  because unexpected  changes  in  the  price  level  under
a  zero  average  inflation  rule  policy  are  permanent,  After  a  shock  has




yt:  lpt  -  E(p.lI"_r)]  +  2..
If  che  rnonetary  authority's  (and  the  publtc's)  lnformation  set  includes
knowledge  of  econornic  wariables  dated  L-1,  then  the  price  level  target  arrd  the
zero  inflation  target  would  result  in  the  same short-terrn  varlability,  ens -
s  The  assumption  of  white-noise  errors  is  not  crucial  ,  we  could  assune
that  €pr -  ar(L)eot  and  en.:  a.(L)e".,  where  ent and  e,.. are  stationary
stochastic  processes.  The  cornparison  of  long-run  volatility  is  not
subscantially  changed  by  this  more  general  assumptlon  about  the  €'s.occurred,  the  monetary  authoritles  are  only  interested  in  achieving  zero
inflation  from  that  point  in  tine;  they  do not  offset  the  price  shock.  Under
a  constant  price  Ievel  policy,  however,  unexpected  price  level  shocks  must be
rewersed.  Therefore,  there  is  substantially  less  long-term  unceftalnty  about
the  pri.ce  .1ewel..under the  pri.ce  lewel  rule  than  under  the  inflaElon  rate  rule.
IIT.  Price  Stability  and Monerary Pollcv
In  this  section,  we examlne the  restrictions  that  the  goal  of  price
stability  places  on the  conduct  of  monetary  policy.  Throughout,  we focus
on whether  pattlcular  policies  are  conslstent  wlth  price  stability  and not
on the  desirabllity,  or  ',optinality",  of  these particular  policies.
Because "prlce  stability"  requires  that  the  long-run  level  of  prices
fluctuate  around  a particular  level,  it  follows  that  the  price  lewel  will
be  a  stationary  stochastic  process.  The requirement  that  prices  be
stationary--or,  ln  other  words,  that  prlces  follow  an  lntegrated  process  of
order  zero,  I(0),  inposes restrictions  on the  long-run  conduct  of  monetary
policy.  Consider  the  sirnple  quantity  theory  relationship  (in  logarithms)
(5)  pt-mt+vt-9.,
where  ro. is  a particular  nonetary  aqgxegate,  vr  is  the  associated  veloclty
aggregate,  and q.  is  real  GNP  in  logarithrns.  Price  stabilicy  requires  m. -
vt  -  9t  be  I(0).  Thus,  monetary  policy  nust  be  conducted  in  such  a way
that  mr  *  vt  -  9t is  I(0).6
For  exarnple, when vt  and q.  are  integrated  of  order  1,  I(1),  then  to
achieve  price  stability,  monetary  policy  rnus  t  follow  a  feedback  rule  in
5  The  basic  insights  of  this  section
macroeconomy.  To  achieve  price  stability,
sources  of  nonstatloriarity  that  otherwlse
hold  for  more general  models  of  the
monetary policy  must offset  all
affect  the  Drice  level.nhlch  the  noney  supply,  veloclEy,  and real  GNP  are  cointegraEed.  An
example  of  a  feedback  that  satLsfies  thts  restrlctlon  is
(6)  rr1:  -  vt-1 + qt_l +  [I(0)]
where  [I(0)]  contains  other  terms  that  are  I(0).
On the.face  of  it,  .this  restrlctlon  does Rot appear to  be wery
powerful;  yet  it  can rule  out  entlre  classes  of  monetary policies.  If  v.
or  qr  is  not  I(0),  then  the  rnoney supply  must be  chosen  so  that  it  lrlll
offsec  the  nonstationarity  of  velocity  and oucput;  in  other  words,  the
actual  money supply  must  follow  some sort  of  feedback  rule.  That  is,  ln
the  long  run,  monetary  policy  must  offset  the  effecEs  of  permanent  shocks
to  velocity  and real  GNP.
ls  it  posslble  that  nt  *  Vt -  9t  is  I(0)  regardless  of  the  behawiot  of
the  money supply?  In  addition  to  not  being  the  case  ernpirically,  this
possibility  is  highly  unllkely  at  a  theoretical  level  because  lt  requlres
velocity,  output,  or  both  to  offset  the  behavlor  of  the  money supply.
Long-tun  money neutrality  of  output  rules  out  this  type  of  behavior.
IV.  Evaluating  Various  Monetary  Rules:  Money Sunply  Targets
Given that  price  stability  requires  rL + vr  -  g.  to  be  I(0),  we
examine  some well-known  nonetary  rules  to  determine  whether  they  meet  lhis
necessary  and sufflcient  condltion  for  price  stabiliuy.  We first  consider
the  implications  of  price  stability  for  money supply  targets.  Of  the  noney
supply  targets,  we consider  two  types  of  "k  percent"  growth  rules--one  in
\thich  control  errors  are  offset  and one  tn  whlch  control  errors  are  not
offset.  We also  consider  the  effects  of  target  cones  on  the  feasibility  of
price  stabili.ty.  Finally,  we consider  the  debate  about  the  approprlatechoice  of  nonetary  aggregate  to  target.
A.  On-averege  k  percent  grovth  rule
Under  k  percent  growth  rules,  the  monetary  authority  attenpts  Eo
control  money growth  so  that  it  increases  at  a k  pereent  annual  rate  in
each  time  period,  lnplying  E(An llr-1)  -  k.  Note  that  if  control  errors  are
not  offset,  actual  money supply  growth  is  giwen  by
(7)  Dt -  mt-r -  1a  +  ry't,
where  $.  is  a  control  error  (which  is  presurnably  a  statlonary  stochastic
proces s--typically  assr.rued  to  be  lrhite  noise).  The money supply,  then,  is
an  I(1)  process  lndependent  of  the  behavior  of  w.  and q..
This  type  of  monetary  rule  !s  very  unlikely  to  meet  the  necessary
condition  for  price  stability  because nt  -  Vt + qt  is  unlikely  to  be I(0)
regardless  of  the  behavior  of  w.  and q..7  Thus,  a k  percent  rule  with  base
drift  that  does not  offset  past  control  errors  is  incapable  of  achlevlng
price  stablli.ty.  This  critique  of  base  drlft  has  been mentioned  by  seweral
authors  includlng  Poole  (L970).
B.  k  percent  growth  rule  that  offsets  eontrol  errors
Unlike  the  base  drift  case  abowe,  it  is  posslble  Lo construct  monetary
grortth  rules  in  which  over  long  tine  horizons,  money grows  at  k  percent  but
control  errors  are  offset.  An example of  a k  percent  rule  that  offsets
control  errors  is  giwen  by
(8)  rr  -  rt-1 :k+.\[mo+k(t-l)-ro.-r]  + {.,
where mo ls  the  level  of  money supply  at  the  time  the  rule  was  inplemented.
TtIe terrn  )  describes  how quickly  control  errors  are  offset.  The money
7  only  in  the
offset  any permanent
very  unlikely
change  in  the
case  in  which  v"  and qt  automatically
noney  supply  will  prices  be  stationary.
7growth  rule  described  by  equation  (8)  results  in  a money supply  that  is
stationary  around  a  deterministic  trend.  Still,  this  tule  only  achlewes
price  stabllity  if  veloclty  and output  afe  statlonary.  In  general,  thls
rule  does not  ensure  ttrat  nt  *  vt  -  gt  wtll  be  I(0).
C.  Target  cones
In  princlple,  target  bands  for  money supply  can  force  the  monetary
authority  to  offset  control  errors;  the  noney  supply  is  contracted  if  it
exceeds  the  band  and  is  expanded tf  lt  ls  below  the  band.  However,  the
current  rnethod of  specifying  target  cones  (in  additlon  to  alloLting  the
target  to  drlft)  is  unlikely  to  yield  price  stabllity.  The reason ls  thab
target  cones  are  not  a particularly  binding  constraint  on  the  noney supply
in  the  long  run.
For  example,  consider  the  case  in  which  the  noney  supply  is  glven  by  a
random rualk with  drift--that  is,  an on-average  k  percent  rule.  The
expected  value  of  the  future  rnoney supply  and  lts  one  standard  devlatlon
confidence  band  are  given  by
(9a)  E(n llo)  t  SD  -  rno  + kt  + a/t,
where  m6 i.s  the  initlal  money supply  level  and o,tr  is  the  standard  deviation
of  the  control  error.
Compare  thls  with  a target  cone of  the  form
(9b) ne  + kt t  6r,
whete  6t  is  the  hridth  of  the  cone.  Regardless  of  the  size  of  the  cone  (6)
and  the  variance  of  control  error  (o{2),  eventually  the  target  cone r,r11l
envelop  the  confideuce  band  for  m..  This  characteristic  irnplies  lhat  a
target  cone  is  not  a particularly  binding  constraint  in  the  long  run  when
the  money supply  follows  a  random walk  with  drlft,  Indeed,  a  target  conethat  is  never  readjusted  is  insufficient  to  yield  price  stabiliEy  even if
velocity  and output  are  themselves  I(0),  Thls  result  suggests  that  the
current  Eonetary  aggregate  targetlng  procedure,  which  combines  a  targeE
cone  and base  drift,  is  unlikely  to  produce  price  stability.
D.  Choos  lng  -th€- appr.oprlate-monetaflr'  aggxegate
The abowe analysis  implies  that  a monetary  aggregate  target  can  only
achieve  price  stability  lf  !L  corrects  for  past  control  errors,  lf  real  GNP
is  stationary,  and if  the  aggregate's  velocity  is  stallonary.  This
implication  raises  the  issue  of  which  monetary  aggxegaxe Lo  target  if  such
a  rule  ls  to  achieve  ptice  stability.  Currently,  many economists  advocate
targeting  either  M2 or  the  monetary  base  (MB).  Empirically,  however;  the
M2 aggregate's  velocity  has been  stationary  over  the  post-World  War II
period,  while  base  velocity  has  not.  This  finding  suggests  using  an M2
rule  i.f  price  stabillty  is  the  ultfunate  goal.8
It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  a  stationary  k  percent  rule  for  M2
implies  a  feedback  rule  for  MB that  also  satisfies  conditions  for  price
stabiliLy.  Assume  that  M2 velocity  ts  I(0),  while  MB  velocity  is  I(1).
Because M2 is  related  to  the  MB through  the  money nultiplier,  M2 (in
logarlthrns  )  equals
(10)  xo2t  -  mbt +  nrnt,
where  mb. is  the  logatithu  of  the  nonetary  base  and mm, is  the  logarithn  of
the  money nultiplier.  Using  the  quantity  relationship  for  M2 and equation
(10),  we can write  a  quantlty  relationship  for  the  monetary  base  in  which
base veloclty  equals
8  Still,  ir  should  be  noted
slationary  time  series.  Indeed,
a  post-World  i{ar  II  phenomenon.
that  M2 velocity  may not  always  remain  a
the  statlonarity  of  M2 welocity  appears  to
I
be(11)  vb.  -  un2" + mm..
Because  vb.  is  I(1)  and un2. is  I(0),  romt  must be I(1,):  the  noney
nultiplier  is  nonstationary.  If  M2 follows  some sort  of  k  percent  rule,
then  the  norretary. base  must  be  given  by  a  feedback-rule  that  adjusts  for
changes  ln  welocity.  Indeed,  the  monetary  base  and  its  velocity  would  be
cointegrated,  which  satisfies  the  condltlons  for  prlce  stabiliuy  if  q.  is
also  stationary.
V.  Evaluating  Varlous  Monetary  Rules;  Alternative  Feedback Rules
Given  that  pure  money supply  targeting  neets  the  requireueuts  of  price
stabllity  only  if  velocity  and real  CNP  are  stationary  and  if  the  noney
supply  ltse1f  is  stationary,  we would  llke  to  ewaluate  whether  other
classes  of  monetary rules  are more likely  to  ensure price  stablllty.  In
this  section,  we examine  seweral  feedback  rules  for  monetary  policy--
including  nominal  cNP targeting,  price  level  uargeting,  and  interest  rate
targeting--and  determine  under  what  conditions  these  rules  ensure  prlce
stab  iI ity.
A,  Slnple  feedback  rules
For  the  case  in  which  velocity  and real  GNP  are  nonstationary  and are
integrated  of  order  I,  I(f),  we showed  in  Section  IlI  rhar  a feedback rule
like  equation  (6)  would be necessary to  generate  price  stability.  In  fact,
several  well-known  feedback  rules  have  the  same basic  form  as  equation  (6).
I,Ialsh  (L985)  examines  a model with  an aggregate  supply  curve  and a  quantity
theory  aggregate  demand  curve,  as weII  as  a  nominal  money supply  equation.
Walsh's  optimal  noney  supply  equation  can be  rewritten  so  that  it  has  the
10same  forn  as equation  (6).
Meltzer  (l-984)  also  ptoposes  a  feedback  rule  that  is  sirnilat  to  thaE
in  equation  (6).  Meltzer's  rule  ls  given  by
(L2)  Am. -  -  (..-r  -  v.-r-r),/k  +  (q._r -  e._r_r)/k,
where  k  is  a prespecified  and constant  lag  length.  - The term  A  is  the
difference  operator,  or  A -  I  -  L  where  L  ls  a  lag  operator  with  Lz.  -  z.-r.
Meltzer's  rule  can be rewritCen  as
(L2a)  ot  -  ro -  .5-  v.-.7t  +,5-q.-1lk,
1:l  a-l
where mo is  the  initial  money supply  and  is  treated  as  a  consLant.
Equation  (12a)  essentially  has  the  sane  fon:n as  equation  (6),  except
Meltzer's  rule  uses a moving average of  past  velocity  and real  GNP  values.
Note  that  Meltzer's  rule  and  the  simple  feedback  rule  given  by  equation  (6)
ensure  price  scabtlity  only  lf  velocity  and real  cNP are  inuegrated  of
order  1-, I(1),  or  less.  If  velocity  or  real  GNP  are  integrated  of  orders
greater  than  L,  the  Meltzer  rule  will  not  guarantee price  stability.
B.  Nomlnal  GNP  targers
Several  tesearchers--Half  (1983);  Tobin  (1-983); Gordon (1985);  Taylor
(1985);  McCallurn  (f988,  1989, 1-990a,  1-990b)--have  suggesred using  nominal
GNP  tatgeting  as  an  intermediate  target  for  monetary  policy.  The
motivatlon  for  thls  type  of  targetlng  is  that  it  avoids  nany  of  the
problems  associated  with  monetary  aggre5axe targeting,  such  as  velocity
instabllity.  We consider  sewaral  well-known  nominal  GNP  rules,  as  weII  as
nominal  GNP  targeting  in  general.
1.  ceneral  nonlnal  cNp rules
A  couple  of  general  points  about  noml-nal  CNP targeting  are  worth
l1naking.  Flfst,  if  the  monetary  authority  targets  the  nomlnal  CNP  gfor,zth
rate,  then  it  can  only  be  sure  that  nonDinal cNP, pt  +  qt,  is  l(l);  there  is
no way of  ensuring  that  prices  are  stationary.  Thus,  to  achieve  price
stabillty,  the  appropriate  nornlnal  GNP  target  must  be  directed  at  the  level
of  norninal  GNP.
Second,  if  the  rnonetafy  authorities  target  the  lewe1  of  noninal  GNP,
then  price  stability  ls  possible,  depending  on  the  behavior  of  oulput,  the
nouinal  GNP  target,  and  the  irnplled  real  GNP  and price  level  targets.  To
illustrate  this  point,  let  nominal GNP  be given  by *.:  pt  {  et,  Consider
the  case  in  which  the  monetary  authority  knows the  current  weloelly  (or  can
calculate  velocity);  then  a  sirnple  example of  a nominal  GNP  rule  would  be
one  in  which  the  money supply  is  set  so  that
(13)  Ax.  -  Ax*t  -  .\(x.-1  -  x*r-r)
(14)An---Avt  + Ax*t -  I(x._, -  x*._r)
where  x*t  ls  the  norninal  cNP target  and 0 <  I  <
is  set  to  offset  pasc  deviations  of  nominal  cNP
If  we use  the  quantity  theory  relatlonshlp
equati.on  to  solve  for  prlces,  rue find  that
(15) pr -  1/[1-(1-r)L]  [Aq*. -  aqr + ap*r -
'  The solution  for  p.  given  above  ignores
inplied  by  the  price  level  difference  equation,
for  p.,  add  the  term
(1-I)'  (po -  1/[1-(1-I)L]  [Aq*o  -  Aqo  + Ap*o
L2
1.  Thus,  the  money supply
C-^--  J.^  F--^^F
L4r6E  L.
and  the  rnoney supply
tr  (9.-:. -  9*.-r  )
the  complenentary  solution
To  get  Ehe general  solution
-  I(9_r -  q*_r) + trp*-rJ)
+ IP*.-r  L
where q*r  and p*.  are  the  irnplled  targets  for  real  GNP  and the price  level,
respectively  (note:  x*. -  q*" + p*.).e  For price  stability,  theappropriate  pfice  target  is  a constant--Chat  is,  p*.:  p*.  Thus,
(16) p. -  p* +  [1/(l-(1-I)L]  [Aq*t -  Aqr -  ](e.-r  -  9*.-r)l  ,
or
(16')  p"  -  p*  +  9*t -  9t.
As  long  as  the  noninal  GNP  target  (glven  the  constant  price  target,  thls
means the  lnplicit  real  GNP  target,  q*t)  adjusts  so  that  9*t  -  9t  is  I(0),
then  the  price  level  will  be an 1(0)  process.  Thls  result  suggests that
nominal  GNP  targeting  is  capable  of  achiewing  price  stability  even  if  real
GNP  is  noustationary  as  long  as  the  iuplied  real  GNP  target  takes  into
account  this  nonstationarity.
Hall  (L983)  and McCallurn  (1989) suggest picklng  a  talget  paEh for
norninal  GNP  once  and  for  all  and keeping  it  fixed.  Their  notivatlon  ls  to
ensure  that  the  nomlnal  GNP  rule  ls  eredible.  Gordon  (1-985) and Tobin
(1-983) suggest  perlodically  reevaluating  the  nominal  cNP target  to  take
lnto  account  changes  tn  potential  GNP.  This  debate  about  how to  choose  the
norninal  GNP  target  is  not  a  trivlal  matter  as  far  as  price  stability  ls
concerned.  As  the  abowe algebra  suggests,  how the  cNP target  is  chosen  can
be  quite  important  for  deternining  whether  price  stability  is  feasible.
Only  with  a periodic  evaluatlon  of  the  nominal  GNP  target  can noninal  cNP
targeting  ensure price  stability  when real  CNP  ls  I(1-).
For  the  case  in  whlch  velocity  is  unknor,m  at  the  Cime monetary  polley
is  conducted.  a  feedback  rule  of  tha  form
(l-7)  Axq -  -  Avt-r  +  Ax*t  -  .\(x.-1  -  x*1-1)
where  the  p0  is  the  price  level  in  the  initial  time  period.nay  satisfy  the  necessary  eonditions  for  price  stablltty.
Solving  for  p.  yields
(18)  p.  -  p*  + 9*t  -  qt +  [1-l(L-(1-I)L]  A2v..
If  1>  I  )  0,  price  stability  ls  feasible  as  long  as velocity  1s I(2)  or
Iess  and q:t. -  q...ls  I(0).
2.  Speclflc  nomlnal  GNP  rules
McCallu.rn  (1988,  1990a, l-990b) in  various  articles  suggests using
the  following  cNP rule:
(19)  An" -  0.0075 -  (v.-r  -  v.-11)  /L6  -  l(xt-t  -  x*.-r),
where  the  rnoney supply  is  the  monetary  base,  the  tine  index  represents
quarters,  and 0.0075  is  the  quarterly  gror.rth rate  in  potenlial  or  target
real  GNP,  or  E(Aq*t).
It  is  clear  that  McCallum's  rule  ls  very  slmilar  to  the  feedback  rule
desctibed  in  equation  (17).  WtLh the  quantlty  theory  equation,  solwing
McCallurn's  nominal  GNP  rule  ylelds
16
(20) p.:  p* +  [1,/(1-(1-r)L]  [0.0075 * 
?:, 
(ot.  -  Lv"_,)  /L6
-  Ag. -  r(q.-r  -  9*.-r)l  ,
or
16  i-l_ (20a)  p. - p* + [1/(1-(1-r)L] t0.007r  * 
?:rl::o(ozv._r)/16
-  Aq, -  )(q._r  -  q*t-r)l
Because Mccallurn's  nominal  cNP target  is  a  deterninisuic  trend,  in  order
fof  the  McGallurn rule  to  yield  price  stabili-Ey,  vi  must  be  I(2)  or  less  and
qt must be  I(0).  Prlce  stability  occurs  only  if  real  GNP  is  trend-
rr4L!vrr4tJ.
Taylor  (1985)  suggests  setting  nomlnal  GNP  so  that
(21) q. -  9*.:  -  P(p. -  p.-r),
_t.+and  q*t  represents  natural  (target)
This  rule  can be  rewritten  as
(22)  Lx.  -  Ag*t  -  (qr_r -  q*._r)





level-  of  real GNPwhereB>0.
+  (1 -  F)  (pt -  Pt-r)
(23)  p" :  po + l/F  (Q.),
where Q. -.E^(q*r  -  qr).  Here,  the  prlce  1evel  is  a function  of  past
a:u
deviatlons  of  real  GNP  frorn  its  target  level.  Taylor's  rule  is  unlikely  to
yield  price  stabillty  because even if  9*r  -  9r ls  I(0),  Q. is  still  l(l).
C.  Prlce  level  targets
Possible  problerns  associated  with  choosing  the  noninal  GNP  target  have
led  soue  (Barro  1986 and McCallum 1990b)  to  suggest  rargering  the  prlce
lewe1  directly.  lndeed,  price  level  rules  appear  to  be  the  most  dlrect  and
flexible  monetary  rules  for  achieving  prlce  stabillty.
McCallum  (L990b)  suggests  a price  lewel  rule  of  the  forn
(24) Arn.:0.0075  -  (v._r -  v"_rr)/L6 +  (qt_r  -  9._v)  /L6
-  tr  (p.-r -  p*.-r),
ls  the  targeted  quarterly  real  GNP  growth rate.  Setting  tbe
(p*.)  equal  to  a constant  1p*;  and solving  McCallum's price
-  P* + [1,/(1-(]--r)Ll [.0075
16  i-r  16  i-l
+E  ,  L+._,/L6  -,  i  tzs-_,/L6l
{-t  i:o  i-1  i-o
Therefore,  for  McCallum's  rule  to  yield  price  stability,  v,  and q.  must  be
I(2)  or  less.  Indeed,  any price  level  rule  that  includes  feedback  terrns
for  velocity  and real  GNP  growth,  as  !n  equation  (24),  will  yield  price
Lfstability  if  veJ-ocity  and real  GNP  are  1(2)  or  less.
McCulloch  (1991)  has  suggested  a price  level  target  of  the  forn
(26)  n- -  I  + fr.-r + b(p*  -  p.-.1,
where  0  < b  <  1,  g  is  related  to  the  growth  rate  of  natural  real  GNP, and
nt-1  is  a weighted.,average  of  past  money-supp1y,  or  frt-1 :  (I  -  a)/(L  -  aL)
rnt-1,  with  0 {  a <  1.  It  is  possible  to  rewrite  McCulloch's  rule  as
(26a)  An" -  C(l  -  a)  + b(l  -  al,)(p*  -  p._r).
Note  that  McCulloch's  rule  is  slrnl-lar  to  Mccallum's  prlce  level  target.
They dlffer  in  that  l,lcCallum's  rule  includes  a veloclty  adjustnent  and a
real  GNP  adjustment,  while  McCulloch's  rule  responds  not  only  !o  deviations
of  last  period's  prices  from the  target  (p*  -  p.-1) but  also  to  deviations
two periods  ago (p*  -  p._z).  Uslng  the  quantlty  theory  equation,  the
l,lcCulloch  rule  implies  a prlce  level  given  by
(?7)  pr:  p*  + E/"b  +  [1-  -  (1  -  b)L  -  abl-2]-1 (Aw. -  Aq").
From equation  (27),  ix  ls  clear  that  the  McCulloch  rule  results  ln  prlce
stability  only  if  velocl.ty  and real  GNP  are  integrated  of  order  1 or  l-ess.
D.  Interest  rate  targets
In  general,  interest  rate  targets  do not  ensure price  stability.
Coodfriend  (1987)  and Van Hoose (1989)  have  shown tha!  the  desire  to  smooth
nominal  interest  rates  leads  to  plice  level  nons  tationarity.  Hence,
interest  rate  targetlng  tends  to  be  inconsistent  \,Jith price  stability,10
10  Mccallurn has  shown that  a pure  interest  rate  peg  does  not  constitute
a well-formulated  monetary  policy.  Sone additlonal  spectficatlon  of  the  money
supply  process  is  needed--for  exarnple,  a money supply  rule.  However,  the
stochastlc  process  for  prices  changes depends on  the  money supply  rule  even
though  the  norninal  lnterest  rate  is  pegged.
LORecently,  Hetzel  (1990)  has  offered  an  interesting  proposal  in  which
the  governnent  lssues  indexed  bonds  as well  as  nominal  bonds  and uses  the
spread  bet\deen the  two  types  of  bonds  as  a  guide  for  x0onetary policy.  We
can  forrnalize  his  proposal  as  a  sinple  feedback  rule  of  the  forrn
(28)  n"  -  Et-1 :  -d(ilrr.  -  ir.),
where  iNr.  is  the  yield  on nomlnal  bonds whlle  1r.  ls  the  yield  on  indexed
bonds.  This  is  a nominal  interest  Taxe xat9ex,  r^rhere  the  target  is  the
real  rate  of  interest  as  reflected  by  the  indexed  bond yleld.
Maklng  use  of  the  Fisher  equatlon,  we can  re!/rlte  equation  (28)  as  an
expected  lnflation  targec,  or
(28a) m. -  nt-1  :  -d[E(p.*rlI.)  -  pr],
where E(p.*tll.)  is  the  rational  expectation  of  the  price  level  aE t  +  1,
given  time  period  t  informati"on.  Using  the  quantluy  theory  equation,  we
can  solve  for  the  inflatlon  rate  (assumlng  ld |  <  f):
(29) Ap.:.t^  (-r)t  E[(Av.*, -  A9.*r)  lI.].
The presence  of  the  expectations  term  prevents  the  difference  operator  on
both  sldes  from  canceling  out.  Therefore,  the  price  lewel  can be
nonstationary  even  if  welocity  and real  GNP  are  stationary.  Thus,  the
Hetzel  interest  rate  target  is  not  llkely  to  generate pflce  stabllity.
VI .  "Ootinal'  Versus  "Feaslble.  Monetarv  Policy
The analysis  in  the  prewious  sections  focused  on whether  price
stability  was feasible  under  various  monetary  rules.  We nade no  attempt
examine  the  character  of  the  optirnal  monetary  rule.  Determining  the
optimal  nonetary  rule  will  require  a  careful  considerauion  of  the  "costs
and benefits"  of  the  various  pollcy  proposals.  In  general,  the  optimal
L7nonetary  rule  will  depend on the  monetary  authority,s  objective  function
(the  monetary  authority  may wish  to  stabilize  real  ouEput  as  well  as
prices);  the  infonnation  available  to  the  monetary  authority  when lt  sets
lts  policy  instruments;  and  the  structure  of  the  economy--not  only  in  terms
of  long-run  dynamics,  such  as  the  orders  of  integratlon  of  lnportant
stochastic  processes,  but  in  terns  of  the  short-term  dynamics  as  r+'e11.
Rather  than  explicltly  examining  the  optlnal  uonetary  rule,  we suggest  ho\{
price  stability  conslderatlons  could  be  forually  lntroduced  into  tbe
analysis  of  optirnal  monetary  pollcy.
Many of  the  analyses  of  monetary  policy--such  as  coodfriend  (1987),
Barro  (1-989)  and Van Hoose (1"989)--typtcally  hawe an objecrive  (or  loss)
functlon  for  monetary  authority  of  the  form
(30) cvar[p.  -  E(p.lI._r)]  + pvarlE(pt+rlI.)  -  p"l  +  ...,
where  c  and B  are  weights  inwolwlng  output  varlabllity  and expected
infl-ation  variabllity.11  Price  stabllity  irnposes strong,  Iong-run
restrictions  on  lhe  conduct  of  oonetary  policy  but  not  nearly  as  strong
restrictlons  on  the  short-terro  conduct  of  nonetary  policy.  Unfortunately,
objectlve  functions  like  equatlon  (30)  place  little  ernphasis on  long-term
uncertainty  of  prices.  Thus,  the  degree to  whlch price  stability  holds
typically  receives  little  weighr  ln  the  analysis  of  optirnal  monerary
policy.
To  lntroduce  price  stabllity  conslderations  into  the  analysis,  l-ong-
term  uncertainly  about  the  price  leve1  must be  factored  into  the  monetary
authority's  oblectiwe  function.  This  could  be  done by  introducing  Ehe
1r The first  Lerm in  equarion  (30)  typically
output  variability,  where  output  is  determlned  by
Phtllips  curve  or  by  a Lucas  supply  function.
reflects  the  loss  due  to
an expectations-augrnented
18variance  of  long-term  forecasts--that  is,  var [p.*1 -  E(p.ryl11)  ]--  lnto  the
monetary  authority's  objective  function.  For  example,  the  nonetary
authorlty's  objective  function  nlght  be  giwen  by
(3f)  .>^  (o, war[p.*, -  E(p.+rlI._r)].+ p, warIE(p.rs*11I.)  -  p.l)  +...,
L:U
whete  the  cr's  and the  B.'s  feflect  the  relative  weights  the  monetary
authority  places  on short-cerm  uncertainty  and  long-tern  uncertalnty.  An
obj ectlve  function  such  as  (31-) would  require  monetary  policy  to  take  into
account  long-term  dynamics  as well  as  short-term  dJmamics.  Of  course,
determlning  the  weights  in  an objective  function  such  as  (31)  requires  a
cleat  understanding  of  the  costs  and benefits  associated  with  reducing
long-run  uncertainty  about  the  price  level.
VII.  Concludine  Rernarks
As we denonstrated  above,  the  goal  of  price  stablllty  lrnplies  strong,
Iong-run  restrictions  for  the  conduct  of  monetary  policy.  In  general,  the
rnoney supply  nust  follow  some sort  of  feedback  rule  that  offsets  lhe
nons  tati-onarity  ln  velocity,  real  GNP, or  both.  Among the  alternative
types  of  monetary  targets,  price  lewel  targeting  and nominal  GNP  targeting
(provided  the  nominal  GNP  target  adjusts  to  account  for  ehanges  in  trend
real  GNP) show the  uost  promise  for  generating  price  stability.  Pure  money
supply  targeting  ylelds  price  stablllty  in  fewer  cirerurstances  than  do
either  price  leve1  targets  or  nomLnal GNP  targets.  Indeed,  the  current
monetary  aggregate  procedures  that  lnclude  target  cones  and base  drift  are
almost  guaranteed  4!  to  result  ln  price  stability.  Our  analysis  focused
on the  feasibility  of  price  stabllity  under  these  alternative  policy  rules.
19To  determl.ne  the  "optimality"  of  these  fu1es,  a beEter  understanding  of  the
effects  of  long-term  price  uncertainty  is  needed.
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